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COORDINATION IS CORRUPTION: AN ARGUMENT FOR
THE REGULATION OF COORDINATED ISSUE ADVOCACY
UNDER CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
ABSTRACT
This Comment analyzes the regulability of coordinated issue advocacy. This
topic was brought into the spotlight following the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
July 2015 decision in State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, which
held that coordinated issue advocacy could not be regulated under state
campaign finance law. The Peterson decision is not the end of the debate, but
rather the beginning.
This Comment takes a common-sense approach in arguing for the
regulability of coordinated issue advocacy. This approach appeals to the
experience of most Americans today, who frequently encounter campaign
advertisements during elections. To bolster the common-sense approach, this
Comment reviews instances of political scandal related to issue advocacy, such
as those involving Senator Alan Cranston and Senator Robert Menendez. It also
analyzes the federal courts’ limited ventures into defining regulable campaign
speech, which reinforce the government’s interest in regulating coordination.
This Comment further analogizes to other areas of law, such as bribery and antigratuity regulations, to better understand the policy concerns underlying
regulable conduct by politicians.
Campaign finance law has been a source of controversy for years. Despite
significant scholarship concerning campaign finance law in general, very little
attention has been paid to the regulability of coordinated speech in conjunction
with issue advocacy. This Comment concludes that coordinated issue advocacy
should be regulable. Coordination alone is enough to lead to corruptive
influence or its appearance, regardless of a communication’s content.
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INTRODUCTION
A candidate is running for political office. The candidate advertises, but there
are limits on advertising spending by the candidate’s campaign. In response to
these limits, the candidate suggests that campaign donors instead donate to a
nonprofit supporting an issue important to the candidate. The nonprofit uses the
donations to create advertisements with input from the candidate, but the
advertisements do not directly solicit votes for the candidate. Can the candidate
continue requesting unlimited, unreported funds for the organization to create
advertisements relating to the issues, without directly mentioning the candidate?
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Almost this exact scenario was presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Spring 2015, in the case State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson.1
During a recall election, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker allegedly requested
that supporters donate to certain nonprofits supporting the Budget Repair Bill
(the Bill), an especially controversial law that he passed.2 The nonprofits used
the funds to create advertisements supporting the Bill and Governor Walker
assisted in determining the advertisements’ content.3 When the Milwaukee
County District Attorney initiated an investigation into the unreported funds, the
nonprofits challenged the investigation on several grounds, including the
argument that the state could not regulate advertisements about issues that do
not mention a specific candidate. The Peterson court sided with the nonprofits,
holding that speech that only mentions issues, known as issue advocacy, is
unregulable, even when a candidate has input on, or coordinates, the
communication.4
Federal campaign finance regulation is well established in the United States.5
Modern regulation is based on the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA),6 as amended in 1974.7 Proponents of regulation point to its role in
ensuring both the integrity of elected government officials and the public
perception of their integrity.8 A democratic society depends on trust in
politicians, because elected officials are supposed to represent the desires of
constituents.9 Prominent politicians becoming embroiled in political corruption
scandals, such as Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey,10 Senator Alan
Cranston of California,11 and Governor Rod Blagojevich of Illinois,12 lend
credence to the idea that politicians will give quid pro quos in exchange for

1

866 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 2015).
O’Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014) (predecessor case to Peterson).
3 Id. at 865, 869.
4 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 193.
5 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (per curiam).
6 Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30126, 30141–30146 (2012).
7 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6.
8 See Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 615–16 (2013).
9 See Mark E. Warren, What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 328, 328 (2004)
(describing the disconnect “between collective decision making and people’s powers to influence collective
decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy,” when there is political corruption).
10 See infra Part III.A.2.
11 See infra Part III.A.1.
12 Rod Blagojevich, CHI. TRIB., http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/politics-government/government/
rod-blagojevich-PEPLT007479-topic.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
2
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monetary donations. For example, regulating campaign funding by requiring
disclosure of donors and the amount of campaign funding gives the public
information to either reveal improper conduct or have confidence that its
politicians are not being improperly influenced.
While the government’s interest in preventing both the appearance of
corruption and actual corruption is strong, politicians and their donors have
strong First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association.13 Those
interests cannot be taken lightly.14 Therefore, balancing the interest in protecting
First Amendment rights with the interest in preventing corruption and its
appearance determines regulable communications in campaign financing.15
In Buckley v. Valeo,16 the Supreme Court identified two important
distinctions to determine the regulability of communications in campaign
finance law. The first is between express advocacy and issue advocacy.17
Express advocacy involves communications which specifically reference a
candidate, or which contain speech that is the “functional equivalent” of a
specific reference.18 This type of advocacy is regulable.19 Issue advocacy
encompasses all other communications, which usually involve communications
concerning an issue rather than a specific candidate.20 This type of advocacy is
not regulable.21
The second distinction is between contributions and independent
expenditures.22 One form of contributions includes coordination or collaboration
between a candidate and an outside organization.23 The clear connection
between contributions and a candidate create a potential for a quid pro quo,
making them regulable.24 In contrast, an isolated independent expenditure
involves no collaboration between a candidate and an outside organization,
making it unregulable.25
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 44.
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45–47; see also infra Part I.A.
Id. at 39, 46.
Id. at 26–27, 38.
Id. at 47.
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Despite the significant scholarship analyzing campaign finance law, perhaps
the most interesting aspect about coordination is that, until recently, it was never
seriously addressed by the courts.26 Buckley makes clear that truly independent
expenditures, whether containing express or issue advocacy, cannot be
regulated.27 Regarding contributions, such as coordination, the law becomes
more complicated.28 Buckley expressly held that combining regulable
contributions with regulable express advocacy allows for regulation of
contributions for express advocacy, like coordinated express advocacy.29
However, the law has not clarified whether combining regulable contributions
with unregulable issue advocacy results in regulable contributions for issue
advocacy, like coordinated issue advocacy.30
This Comment argues that coordinated issue advocacy should be regulable.
In rejecting regulation of coordinated issue advocacy, the Peterson decision was
in error. Determining a communication’s regulability should depend on a
candidate’s involvement in an exchange of money to pay for valued political
communication; it should not depend on the final communication’s content.
Common sense dictates that the risk for corruption or its appearance arises
not only when a communication specifically mentions a candidate, but also when

26 See Smith, supra note 8, at 606 (expressing surprise that in the “more than 35 years after Buckley was
decided, courts and commentators have engaged in remarkably little analysis of the theory of coordination and
independent expenditures”).
27 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.
28 O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[C]onstitutional protection for raising funds
to engage in issue advocacy coordinated with a politician’s campaign committee has not been established
‘beyond debate.’”); Brief Amici Curiae for the Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21 Supporting Appellants
and Urging Reversal at 4, O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1822).
29 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38; see also Chisholm, 769 F.3d at 941 (declining to question the regulability of
coordinated express advocacy). Although the law itself is clear in this respect, there is a strong sentiment by
some, led by Justice Thomas, that there should be no campaign finance regulation. Justice Thomas desires to
protect First Amendment rights, emphasizing the importance of allowing “political expression” and association.
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 638 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part). According to Justice Thomas, contribution regulations infringe “as directly
and as seriously upon freedom of political expression and association” as independent expenditure regulations.
Id. at 640. For more on this perspective, see Steven B. Lichtman, Black Like Me: The Free Speech Jurisprudence
of Clarence Thomas, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 415, 429–37 (2009).
30 Scholarly articles even state both sides of the debate as fact. Compare Brent Ferguson, Beyond
Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
471, 484 (2015) (“[C]oordinated expenditures that do not contain express advocacy . . . are not treated as
contributions . . . .”), with David A. Pepper, Recasting the Issue Ad: The Failure of the Court’s Issue Advocacy
Standards, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 141, 165 (1997) (“[M]ost campaigns either misunderstood or ignored outright
the requirement that issue advertisements cannot be coordinated by or with campaign committees or
candidates.” (emphasis added)).
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a candidate is at all involved in a communication.31 This notion underlies bribery
and anti-gratuity statues that regulate permissible contact between candidates
and their supporters.32 Furthermore, candidates value issue advocacy for policies
they support, as demonstrated by political scandals involving Senator Alan
Cranston, Senator Robert Menendez, and Governor Walker in Peterson.33
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I synthesizes the development of
campaign finance law, from FECA’s statutory foundation through Buckley and
subsequent developments that have helped shape campaign finance law today.
Part II expounds upon the Peterson decision in light of current campaign finance
regulation, including its background, decision, and dissents. Part III
demonstrates that coordination leads to corruption or its appearance by
following a common-sense approach, referencing modern examples of political
corruption and regulation of bribery and certain gratuities. Part IV validates the
importance of coordinated issue advocacy’s regulability in the Super PAC era
and alleviates potential concerns with regulating coordinated issue advocacy in
two scenarios: uncontested or noncompetitive elections and lobbying efforts.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
Part I of this Comment addresses the development of campaign finance law
at the federal level, from FECA and Buckley until today. It focuses on regulatory
policy and two distinctions: between express and issue advocacy and between
independent expenditures and contributions. This framework determines a
communication’s regulability, making it vital in determining the regulability of
coordinated issue advocacy.
A. The Framework and Foundation for Campaign Finance Law
FECA is the statutory foundation for federal campaign finance law and sets
forth a number of restrictions on communications concerning elections.34 In
1974, the statute was significantly amended, strengthening FECA with a focus
31

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.C.2.
33 See infra Part III.A.
34 Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30126 (2012); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–
14. Along with the federal campaign finance regulation, states have individual campaign finance regulation laws
that are generally modeled after FECA and Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations, although the extent
of regulation varies state-by-state. See Ferguson, supra note 30, at 485–87 (comparing and contrasting the
definition of coordination in Maine, Florida, and Connecticut, concluding that “federal and state laws vary to
some degree in their breadth” but nonetheless have commonalities in defining coordination).
32
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on “preventing another Watergate.”35 Buckley was the first Supreme Court case
interpreting FECA following its 1974 amendments, establishing the foundation
for modern campaign finance regulation.36
In Buckley, the Court articulated the government’s key policy concern
underlying campaign finance regulation: “the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of
large financial contributions,” specifically, quid pro quo corruption.37 The
“appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities
for abuse inherent in a regime” was of “almost equal concern” with actual quid
pro quo arrangements.38
Despite this policy concern, campaign financing cannot be regulated unless
the policy overcomes a donor or candidate’s First Amendment rights to free
speech and free association.39 First Amendment freedoms are of the utmost
concern in campaign finance law because the United States political system is
predicated on citizens electing their representatives for office.40 Restrictions on
political speech warrant particular scrutiny because “a major purpose of [the
First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”41
The Court has gone as far as to suggest that “it can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to
the conduct of campaigns for political office.”42 Significant regulation of
political speech would inhibit citizens’ ability to make informed voting
decisions,43 undermining the purpose of a representative government.44
The balancing act between First Amendment rights and preventing
corruption has led to two distinctions affecting a communication’s regulability:

35 Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 613–14.
36 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976) (per curiam).
37 Id. at 25. The concern with the appearance of corruption exists even when there are full disclosure
requirements for contributions. Id. at 28. The singular policy concern in quid pro quo corruption was reiterated
in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 452 (2010).
38 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
39 Id. at 29.
40 Id. at 14–15 (first citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); then citing Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
41 Id. at 14 (quoting Mills, 384 U.S. at 218).
42 Id. at 15 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 272).
43 By limiting the amount of money that can be spent on political communications, the number of
communications, and therefore the amount of information reaching the public, decreases. Id. at 11.
44 See id. at 14–15.
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first, between issue and express advocacy, and second, between contributions
and independent expenditures.
The first distinction is between communications utilizing issue versus
express advocacy.45 Communications utilizing issue advocacy “propagate one’s
views on issues without expressly calling for a candidate’s election or defeat.”46
On the other hand, communications expressly advocating for a candidate contain
“explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a . . . ‘clearly identified’”
candidate for political office.47 The Court permitted regulation of express
advocacy, but not issue advocacy, to avoid an unconstitutionally vague
interpretation of FECA’s language allowing regulation of speech “relative to” a
candidate.48
To clarify the line between express and issue advocacy,49 the Court initially
identified what have been called the “magic words of express advocacy”50 to
determine language constituting regulable express advocacy.51 However, in the
2000s, the Court expanded the definition of express advocacy beyond the
Buckley “magic words”52 to include language that is “functional[ly] identical.”53

45

Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 44.
47 Id. at 43–44. A “clearly identified” candidate requires an “unambiguous reference to his identity” within
the communication. Id. at 43 n.51.
48 Id. at 41, 44.
49 The Court cited Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945) for its concern that without a clear standard,
there is “no security for free discussion,” the First Amendment concern that the Court sought to avoid. Buckley,
424 U.S. at 43.
50 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 495 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). These “magic words” include: “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for
Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ defeat,’ [and] ‘reject.’” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
51 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. The text of footnote 52 states that regulation only applies to “communications
containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’” id. at 44 n.52 (emphasis added),
meaning this may not have been intended as a “magic words” test. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson,
The First Amendment Needs No Reform: Protecting Liberty from Campaign Finance “Reformers”, 51 CATH.
U. L. REV. 785, 790 n.27 (2002) (“The express advocacy test is not a ‘magic words’ test . . . .”). Nonetheless,
courts and academics alike have shown that the “magic words” have been relevant in identifying express
advocacy. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) (“[T]he use or omission of ‘magic words’ . . .
marked a bright statutory line separating ‘express advocacy’ from ‘issue advocacy.’”), overruled on other
grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Is Soft Money
Here to Stay Under the “Magic Words” Doctrine?, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 35 (1998) (noting courts’
concerns about FECA loopholes due to a “magic words” test).
52 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
53 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c) (2017); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126, 193. Although McConnell only addressed
defining express advocacy in the context of electioneering communications, as defined in Federal Election
Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2012), this language has since been codified in the Bipartisan Campaign
46
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Speech is defined as functionally identical when it is “susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.”54 Only “genuine issue ads,” which “focus on a legislative issue, take
a position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the
public to contact public officials with respect to the matter” without mentioning
elections, candidates, or political parties, were excluded from regulation.55 By
excluding only genuine issue ads from regulation, these developments permit
regulation of a broader range of coordinated communications than Buckley.56
After narrowing the scope of possible regulation to express advocacy, the
Buckley Court addressed the second distinction that determines the regulability
of communications, contributions versus independent expenditures.57
Contributions include “controlled or coordinated expenditures” with a
candidate, campaign, or political party in connection with an election
campaign.58 The Court determined that campaign contributions are “the narrow
aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption
[has] been identified” and gave little attention to burdens to First Amendment
association rights implicated by regulating contributions.59 The potential for
contributions to be “given to secure a political quid pro quo” undermines “the
integrity of our system of representative democracy.”60 Therefore, the Court
accepted contribution limits as a “corollary” restraint on the freedom of
association.61

Reform Act of 2002 to define a coordinated communication and applies beyond electioneering communications.
11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c) (2016); see also infra footnotes 74–77 and accompanying text.
54 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469–70.
55 Id. at 456–58, 470.
56 The advertisements in Wisconsin Right to Life met the criteria for genuine issue advertisements, id. at
476, including the advertisement “Wedding” which urged the public to contact their senators to oppose filibuster
delays blocking federal judicial nominees, id. at 458–59. The Fourth Circuit held that the advertisement,
“Change” to be the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681
F.3d 544, 554–55 (4th Cir. 2012). The advertisement did not ask individuals to vote for or against Obama, but
instead purported to tell “the real truth about Obama’s position on abortion,” with examples of policy changes
that it believed would be enacted should Obama be elected. Id. at 546.
57 By limiting the scope of potentially regulable communications to express advocacy prior to analyzing
the distinction between independent expenditures and contributions, the Court did not address the combination
of contributions, like coordination, and issue advocacy. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1975).
58 Id. at 39, 46 (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 26–28; Smith, supra note 8, at 611 (“[T]he Buckley Court saw the major issue with contribution
limitations not as their infringement on speech, but on association.”).
60 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27.
61 Id. at 38; Smith, supra note 8, at 618.
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An independent expenditure, in contrast to a contribution, lacks a candidate’s
control or input.62 The Court determined that large independent expenditures did
not “pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified
with large campaign contributions”63 because without “prearrangement and
coordination,” there is no “danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”64 Further, regulation could
impose significant potential burdens on the First Amendment freedoms of
speech and association.65 Balancing the lower governmental interest with the
severe burden placed on First Amendment freedoms, the Court held that
independent expenditures could not be regulated.66
B. Coordinated Communications as a Subset of Contributions
Coordinated communications are considered a form of “disguised
contributions” that could serve as a quid pro quo for political favors from the
candidate.67 Coordinated speech is “as useful to the candidate as cash,” because
candidates can guarantee that those expenditures benefit their campaigns.68 This
aligns with the rationale to regulate contributions and contrasts with independent
expenditures, which are not as useful because candidates cannot control the
content to their advantage.69
Today, the primary federal definition of coordination as a subset of
contributions is statutory and regulatory.70 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA)71 overhauled the old FEC regulations defining coordinated

62

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
Id. at 46.
64 Id. at 47.
65 Id. at 44.
66 Id. at 51. This reasoning also applies to independent expenditures by corporations. Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
67 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001). This was true even if the
party itself coordinated expenditures with a candidate. Id. at 464.
68 Id. at 446.
69 See id.
70 Regulable contributions include “indirect contributions that take the form of coordinated expenditures,
defined as ‘expenditures made . . . in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion
of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.’” Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 611 (1996) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), currently Federal Election Campaign
Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i) (2012)).
71 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
63
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communications in favor of three criteria to determine a coordinated
communication.72
First, the communication must be “paid for, in whole or in part, by a person
other than that candidate, authorized committee, or political party committee.”73
Second, the communication must meet at least one of the five content
standards in the regulation.74 Content standards include: (1) electioneering
communications, (2) public communications revealing campaign materials
prepared by a candidate or authorized representative (3) public communications
that expressly advocate for a candidate, (4) public communications that
reference clearly identified federal office candidates or political parties within
either 9075 or 12076 days of an election, or (5) public communications that are
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.77
Third, the communication must meet at least one of the five conduct
standards in the regulation.78 Three standards relevant for this analysis are: (1)
request or suggestion of a candidate79 or assent by a candidate to suggestions for
the communication, (2) material involvement by the candidate in decisions, and
(3) substantial discussion with a candidate prior to creating the
communication.80 The regulation made clear that conduct standards do not
require “[a]greement or formal collaboration,” defined as a mutual

72

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a) (2017); Coordinated Communications, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,947, 55,949 (Sept. 15,
2010). The FEC struggled to develop a constitutional definition of coordination, with regulations being struck
down as “arbitrary and capricious” in 2004 in Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 414 F.3d
76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) and again in 2007 in Shays v. FEC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 914
(D.C. Cir. 2008). Smith, supra note 8, at 621.
73 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(1).
74 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(2). The content portion of a coordinated expenditure had been a source of
confusion under the old regulations. See Thomas & Bowman, supra note 51, at 33 (expressing concern with the
implications if an express advocacy requirement were applied to the definition of coordinated expenditures).
75 The ninety-day limit applies to U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate candidates. 11 C.F.R.
§ 109.21(c)(4)(i).
76 The 120-day limit applies to Presidential candidates. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(4)(ii).
77 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c). The FEC added the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” standard in 2011,
following the language in McConnell and Wisconsin Right to Life. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(5); Coordinated
Communications, 75 Fed. Reg. at 55,952; see supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
78 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(3).
79 For the purposes of explaining the conduct standards of BCRA, the word “candidate” refers to the
candidate, the candidate’s authorized committee, or a political party committee.
80 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21(d)(1–3). The other two standards include: (1) if a common commercial vendor that
created the communication also provided certain services to a candidate, or the candidate’s opponent, within the
last 120 days, and (2) the communication is paid for by a former employee or independent contractor of the
candidate, and that person served the candidate within the previous 120 days. 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21(d)(4–5).
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understanding or planned work on the communication, respectively, with the
candidate clearly identified in the communication.81 If a communication meets
the payment requirements and at least one of the content and conduct standards
outlined above, then it will be regulable.82
Based on the foregoing analysis, the regulability of three categories of speech
is clear: (1) independent expenditures are not subject to regulation under federal
campaign finance law, regardless of whether they contain issue or express
advocacy, (2) express advocacy, and its functional equivalent, can be regulated
when coordinated with a candidate, and (3) issue advocacy is not subject to
regulation under federal campaign finance law. Interestingly, despite the
substantial body of case law involving campaign finance regulation which has
developed at the Supreme Court level,83 the Court has not answered a significant
question left open by Buckley: if issue advocacy cannot be regulated, and
contributions, including coordination, can be regulated, can issue advocacy be
regulated when coordinated with a candidate?84 The remainder of this Comment
provides an analysis of campaign finance law and principles to answer this
longstanding question.
II. WISCONSIN: COORDINATED ISSUE ADVOCACY CANNOT BE REGULATED
Although the United States Supreme Court has not made clear whether
coordinated issue advocacy can be regulated, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson definitively answered this
question in the negative.85 In the first judicial test of the question, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that Governor Walker’s coordination of issue advocacy
could not be regulated.
Beginning in 2011, Wisconsin’s political scene became contentious
following Republican Governor Scott Walker’s proposal and subsequent

81

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e).
Coordinated Communications, 75 Fed. Reg. at 55,949.
83 See James Bopp, Jr., Randy Elf & Anita Y. Milanovich, Contribution Limits After McCutcheon v. FEC,
49 VAL. U. L. REV. 361 (2015) (discussing many Supreme Court decisions that have influenced modern
campaign finance law).
84 O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014) (presenting the question, “[C]an government
also regulate coordination of contributions and speech about political issues, when the speakers do not expressly
advocate any person’s election?”).
85 State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165, 186 (Wis. 2015).
82
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passage of the Budget Repair Bill86 restricting collective bargaining rights of
public sector unions.87 The Bill was so controversial that it prompted a recall
election for Governor Walker.88 During that election, Governor Walker
allegedly solicited donors to give money to conservative issue advocacy groups,
such as the nonprofit Wisconsin Club for Growth (WCFG).89 The donations
were used by WCFG to create communications in support of the Bill,90 and
WCFG directed funds to other organizations that would support the Bill’s policy
goals.91 Governor Walker subsequently won the recall election on June 6,
2012.92
The issue advocacy came under investigation a couple months after the recall
election.93 The Milwaukee Attorney General initiated a John Doe proceeding94
targeting alleged “illegal campaign coordination” between the campaign

86 This bill is more commonly known as Act 10. Dave Umhoefer, For Unions in Wisconsin, a Fast and
Hard Fall Since Act 10, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 27, 2016), https://projects.jsonline.com/news/
2016/11/27/for-unions-in-wisconsin-fast-and-hard-fall-since-act-10.html.
87 O’Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014).
88 Brian Montopoli, Scott Walker Wins Wisconsin Recall Election, CBSNEWS (June 6, 2012, 12:20 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-walker-wins-wisconsin-recall-election/. There were six recall elections in
total, including for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and four state senators. 2012 Recall Election for Governor,
Lt. Governor, and State Senator, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N (June 5, 2012), http://elections.wi.gov/electionsvoting/results/2012/recall-election.
89 Ed Pilkington et al., Because Scott Walker Asked, THE GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/ng-interactive/2016/sep/14/john-doe-files-scott-walker-corporate-cash-american-politics (last visited Feb.
16, 2017).
90 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 864. WCFG director Eric O’Keefe stated that the advertisements’ purpose
was to advance WCFG’s “pro-liberty, fiscal responsibility, pro-[Budget Repair Bill] beliefs. None of the
advertisements expressly urged voters to vote for or against any candidate.” Pilkington et al., supra note 89.
These advertisements were treated as genuine issue advertisements. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
91 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 864.
92 Montopoli, supra note 88.
93 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 865.
94 At the time, a John Doe proceeding, pursuant to Wisconsin Statute § 968.26, WIS. STAT. § 968.26
(2015), allowed a judge to supervise an investigation into criminal activity in a jurisdiction even without an
initial named target, O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 937 (7th Cir. 2014), as long as the investigation’s
scope was “limited to the subject matter of the complaint upon which the John Doe [was] commenced,” State ex
rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165, 199 (Wis. 2015) (quoting State v. Washington, 266
N.W.2d 597, 604 (Wis. 1978)). Upon belief that there is criminal activity, the judge could convene proceedings,
potentially in secret, and issue subpoenas to relevant parties. WIS. STAT. § 968.26. Following the Peterson
decision, this statute has been modified to limit the use of the John Doe investigative powers, such as eliminating
secrecy orders during investigations. Wis. Gov. Scott Walker Signs Bill Ending Secret ‘John Doe’ Investigations
into Political Misconduct, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 23, 2015, 5:51 PM) [hereinafter John Doe], http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-scott-walker-john-doe-investigation-bill-20151023-story.
html.
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committee and certain nonprofit interest groups.95 Specifically, the
investigators96 alleged that during the recall election, Governor Walker or his
campaign committee coordinated with nonprofits,97 including a “wide-ranging
scheme” in which Governor Walker requested that donors contribute funds to
WCFG rather than to his campaign.98 His campaign then controlled the content
and airtime of the advertisements created by WCFG.99 The investigators alleged
a “blatant attempt to avoid the regulations governing contributions to candidates
and their campaign committees” when the campaign did not report the funds as
contributions.100
In state court, Judge Gregory Peterson granted a motion to quash the John
Doe subpoenas and search warrants, which he stayed, along with halting the
investigation, pending appeal.101 In response, WCFG sought a federal injunction
against the state case being heard by the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on the grounds that,
regardless of whether there was coordination, issue advocacy was
unregulable.102 The investigators argued that “issue advocacy does not create a
free-speech ‘safe harbor’ when expenditures are coordinated between a
candidate and a third-party organization.”103 Judge Randa disagreed.104
Coordination would not add a threat of quid pro quo corruption to issue
advocacy,105 because “[l]ogic instructs that there is no room for a quid pro quo
95

Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 865.
District Attorneys in five counties launched John Doe investigations. Id. at 866. To avoid allegations of
impropriety due to all of the District Attorneys being affiliated with the Democratic Party, a nonpartisan special
prosecutor, Deputy United States Attorney Francis Schmitz, was assigned to lead the investigations. Id.
97 Although Schmitz states that WCFG did not run advertisements related to the recall petition, id., the
investigators accused WCFG of a scheme involving other nonprofits related to the recall election, id. at 867.
98 Id.; Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 260–61 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Although
the court does not identify the nonprofit accused of coordination in Peterson, it appears to be WCFG. See
Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 866 (identifying WCFG advisors R.J. Johnson and Deborah Jordahl as individuals
whose homes were raided by the police); Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 182–83 (search warrants were authorized on
the homes of Unnamed Movants Nos. 6 and 7).
99 See Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 867; Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 261 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Under federal regulations, this conduct would meet the conduct standard for regulable
coordinated communications. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. Although this is a state law case,
most states closely model their statutes after FECA, making federal regulations instructive for states’
interpretations of their campaign finance statutes. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
100 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 261 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Schmitz, 19 F.
Supp. 3d at 867.
101 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 867; Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 177.
102 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 868, 871.
103 Id. at 871–72.
104 Id. at 872.
105 Quid pro quo corruption specifically is required following Citizens United. See supra note 37.
96
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arrangement when the views of the candidate and the issue advocacy
organization coincide.”106 Thus, Judge Randa ordered an injunction on the John
Doe investigation.107
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook made quick work of
reversing the injunction because the federal court did not have jurisdiction to
interpret the state law statute.108 Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook felt that Judge
Randa “broke new ground,” as “[n]o opinion issued by the Supreme Court, or
by any court of appeals, establishes (‘clearly’ or otherwise) that the First
Amendment forbids regulation of coordination between campaign committees
and issue-advocacy groups—let alone that the First Amendment forbids even an
inquiry into that topic.”109
With the federal injunction removed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in
Peterson, was able to address the issues related to campaign finance.110 Justice
Gableman’s decision turned on interpreting Wisconsin Statute section 11.01,111
specifically the state’s definition of “political purposes,” because the statute only
permits regulation of contributions “made for political purposes.”112 The statute
defined “political purposes,” in relevant part, as acts “done for the purpose of
influencing the election or nomination for election of any individual to state or
local office, [or] for the purpose of influencing the recall from or retention in
office of an individual holding a state or local office.”113 Acts for political
purposes included, but were not limited to, “[t]he making of a communication
which expressly advocates the election, defeat, recall or retention of a clearly
identified candidate or a particular vote at a referendum.”114
106 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 872. The language “logic instructs” highlights that there was no precedent
cited in the opinion for the language quoted above. See Brief Amici Curiae for the Campaign Legal Center &
Democracy 21 Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal at 25, O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir.
2014) (No. 14-1822). This decision was based on an analysis of Wisconsin Statute section 11.01, as discussed
in Peterson. See infra text accompanying notes 111–14.
107 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 875.
108 Chisholm, 769 F.3d at 937. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012), provides that a federal
court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” none of which
were true in the district court case. Chisholm, 769 F.3d at 937. Judge Easterbrook considered the Supreme
Court’s uncertainty in defining “coordination” a significant reason to remand the case to state court to decide
the issue “as a matter of state law without any need to resolve these constitutional questions.” Id. at 941.
109 Id. at 942.
110 State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 2015).
111 WIS. STAT. § 11.01 (2015).
112 § 11.01(6)(a)(1); Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 178.
113 WIS. STAT. § 11.01(16) (emphasis added).
114 § 11.01(16)(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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Justice Gableman focused on the Supreme Court’s distinction between issue
and express advocacy, rather than between coordinated and independent
expenditures, to support holding that the definition of “political purposes” was
overbroad if applied to issue advocacy.115 Even if a “compelling governmental
interest” in preventing quid pro quo corruption justifies regulation of express
advocacy, the Court had suggested that this distinction “‘might not apply to’ the
regulation of issue advocacy.”116 Justice Gableman cited the Seventh Circuit
decision in Wisconsin Right to Life v. Barland (Barland II)117 for the proposition
that, to protect First Amendment rights, the government can extend regulation
“only to money raised and spent for speech that is clearly [express advocacy];
ordinary political speech about issues, policy, and public officials,” that is, issue
advocacy, “must remain unencumbered.”118 By limiting the definition of
“political purposes” to express advocacy and its functional equivalent, issue
advocacy could not be regulated.119 Thus, the court did not examine the role of
coordination in determining the regulability of speech and ended the John Doe
investigation.120
Unsurprisingly, this decision had multiple dissents. Justice Abrahamson’s
vigorous dissent argued that the majority’s “[a]nything [g]oes” attitude
regarding regulation of issue advocacy “adopt[ed] an unprecedented and faulty
interpretation of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law and of the First
Amendment.”121 Justice Abrahamson defended her perspective by analyzing the
policy behind Wisconsin’s campaign finance statute:122 to prevent a “potential
corrupting influence” when “the true source of support or extent of support [for
a candidate] is not fully disclosed, or when a candidate becomes overly
dependent upon large private contributors.”123 Finding this potential corrupting

115

Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 188–89.
Id. at 188 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 471 (2007)).
117 751 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2014).
118 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 188 (quoting Barland II, 751 F.3d at 810).
119 Id. at 193. The special prosecutor’s theory relied on violations of Wis. Stat § 11.10(4) and the Wisconsin
Government Accountability Board’s regulation GAB 1.20(1)(e). Id. at 194–95. By limiting the definition of
“political purposes” to include only express advocacy and its functional equivalent, the actions in this case were
not subject to regulation under either theory. Id. at 194.
120 Id. at 179.
121 Id. at 253 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
122 Id. at 254.
123 Id.
116
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influence in coordination, Justice Abrahamson concluded that “coordinated
disbursements for issue advocacy” must be reported as contributions.124
Like the majority, Justice Abrahamson looked to Supreme Court precedent
but focused on precedent concerning coordination.125 Justice Abrahamson noted
that the Court “has not differentiated between coordinated expenditures made
for issue advocacy purposes and coordinated expenditures made for express
advocacy purposes.”126 Justice Abrahamson looked to Buckley’s rationale for
leaving issue advocacy unregulated because it may be duplicative or
counterproductive to a candidate.127 However, when a candidate coordinates,
these concerns are absent.128 The Court’s treatment of coordinated expenditures
as “disguised contributions” does not appear to implicate the type of
advocacy.129 It implicates the nature of coordination itself.130
Justice Crooks’s dissent followed the same vein. Justice Crooks believed
there was no overbreadth problem in defining “political purpose” with the
language “for the purpose of influencing” an election.131 The Buckley Court had
already deemed the language “for the purpose of influencing” an election
overbroad only in the context of independent expenditures; the language was
appropriate to regulate contributions.132 Buckley indicated that a “general
understanding”133 or “common sense” would inform people as to “what is and
is not a campaign contribution,”134 such as coordination. This common sense
would inform people that the purpose of coordination is to influence an election
and therefore should be regulable.135

124 Id. at 256. Coordinating a disbursement in Wisconsin requires the disbursement be from third parties
“with the authorization, direction or control of or otherwise by prearrangement” with a benefitted candidate. Id.
at 259 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 11.06(4)(d) (2015)).
125 Id. at 269.
126 Id. at 264, 274. Justice Abrahamson uses the word “expenditure” to refer to both issue and express
advocacy. See id.
127 Id. at 264; see also infra note 290 and accompanying text.
128 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 264.
129 Id. at 269.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 377 (Crooks, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
132 Id. at 383.
133 Id. at 377 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 n.24 (1976) (per curiam)).
134 Id.
135 See id. at 388.
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III. COORDINATION ALONE LEADS TO QUID PRO QUO CORRUPTION OR
ITS APPEARANCE
The courts have attempted to reach an agreeable balance between First
Amendment rights and the government’s right to prevent corruption and its
appearance.136 This Part demonstrates that coordinated issue advocacy reaches
a point of regulable contributions. Empirical evidence demonstrates political
corruption involving issue advocacy.137 A common-sense approach to
understanding the empirical evidence, an approach encouraged by Justice
Crooks in his Peterson dissent,138 demonstrates issue advocacy’s value to
candidates and its potential to lead to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.
The policy behind bribery and illegal gratuity laws, with its concern with
political quid pro quos, validates the empirical and common-sense principles
indicating coordinated issue advocacy’s potential for corruption.
A. Issue Advocacy Has Value to Candidates
Despite the Peterson majority’s finding to the contrary, there is substantial
empirical evidence of issue advocacy’s value to politicians both in state and
federal government.139 As demonstrated by the political favors accepted by
Senator Cranston in the Keating Five scandal, the alleged bribes given to Senator
Menendez for issue advocacy, and the alleged conduct of Governor Walker
leading to the litigation in Peterson, issue advocacy can cause quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance. Politicians value issue advocacy, and history
demonstrates their willingness to trade favors for money to fund political
campaigns.
1. Senator Cranston in the Keating Five Scandal
The events leading to the Keating Five scandal arose in 1984, when the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, led by Chairman Ed Gray, sought to impose
regulations on the savings and loan bank industry.140 The industry had been only
lightly regulated, and the threat of greater government oversight did not please

136 See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 476 (2007); Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 179, 187–88;
supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
137 See infra Part III.A.
138 See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
139 See Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 260 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
140 The Banking Crisis: Lincoln, Keating, and Gray, KEATINGFIVE.ORG [hereinafter Banking Crisis],
http://keatingfive.org/about (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
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industry leaders like Charles Keating.141 After Keating attempted to oust Gray
as Chairman, Gray investigated Keating’s savings and loan bank and claimed to
uncover ethics violations.142
As the investigation continued, Keating reached out to five U.S. Senate
members, including Senator Alan Cranston.143 Keating contributed almost $1
million to organizations either run by or affiliated with Senator Cranston,
including voter registration groups run by Senator Cranston and his son.144
Senator Cranston subsequently attended meetings with Gray on Keating’s
behalf.145 The Senate eventually caught onto the potentially unethical conduct
in protecting a campaign contributor and investigated these five senators, the socalled Keating Five.146 The Ethics Committee formally reprimanded Senator
Cranston, and he left the Senate following the completion of his term.147
Senator Cranston’s conduct during the Keating Five scandal shows issue
advocacy’s value to candidates. Rather than Senator Cranston accepting only
direct campaign donations, Keating persuaded the senator to support him by
donating to issue advocacy groups promoting voter registration, an important
cause to Senator Cranston.148 Senator Cranston risked harsh consequences if this
unethical behavior was discovered; even so, he valued the contribution toward
the issue enough to make the reward worth the risk.149 This indicates that
candidates value contributions to organizations supporting issues the candidate
also supports comparably to direct campaign contributions. Therefore, issue
advocacy should be regulable in certain situations, like when combined with
something valuable to candidates like coordination.

141

Id.
Id.
143 Id. The other senators investigated include Donald Riegle of Michigan, Dennis DeConcini of Arizona,
John Glenn of Ohio, and John McCain of Arizona. Id.
144 Alan Cranston, KEATINGFIVE.ORG, http://keatingfive.org/actors/senators/Alan-Cranston (last visited
Jan. 9, 2016). For comparison, Keating contributed only $132,000 to actual campaigning for the senator. Richard
L. Berke, Cranston Inquiry Widens to Include Signups of Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1989), http://www.
nytimes.com/1989/12/06/us/cranston-inquiry-widens-to-include-signups-of-voters.html?pagewanted=all.
145 Banking Crisis, supra note 140.
146 Id.
147 Alyssa Fetini, A Brief History of the Keating Five, TIME (Oct. 8, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/
business/article/0,8599,1848150,00.html; Banking Crisis, supra note 140.
148 Banking Crisis, supra note 140.
149 Berke, supra note 144. Senator Cranston described voter registration as a “‘driving force’ in his political
career.” Id.
142
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2. The Alleged Bribery of Senator Menendez
In 2014, Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey was accused of accepting
bribes during his 2012 campaign for reelection to the U.S. Senate.150 Dr.
Salomon E. Melgen is the alleged source of the bribes.151 Through his company,
Dr. Melgen gave $700,000 in corporate contributions to the Senate Majority
Super PAC,152 which, among other candidate-specific initiatives, advocates on
issues important to Democratic candidates in general.153 Dr. Melgen also
donated nearly $1 million to Senator Menendez’s campaign and party groups.154
With the support of this funding, New Jersey reelected Senator Menendez.155
These campaign donations, according to prosecutors, were not without
strings.156 After reelection, Senator Menendez allegedly pressured federal
officials to intervene in a Medicare reimbursement policy dispute for Dr.
Melgen’s financial benefit, and Senator Menendez supported a port security deal
involving Dr. Melgen.157 Senator Menendez’s actions have led to bribery
charges that could result in up to fifteen years in prison,158 with trial pending.159
This scenario demonstrates the importance of issue advocacy to candidates
in two ways. First, Dr. Melgen allegedly provided significant funding to Super
PACs and party groups to bribe Senator Menendez.160 These groups advocate
for issues important to the party, rather than just for specific candidates.161
Second, Senator Menendez allegedly accepted bribes in exchange for
150 Alexander Burns, Some Counts Dismissed in Indictment of Robert Menendez, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/nyregion/some-counts-dismissed-in-indictment-of-robertmenendez.html.
151 Matt Apuzzo, Senator Robert Menendez Indicted on Corruption Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/nyregion/senator-robert-menendez-indicted-on-corruption-charges.html.
152 Id.
153 SENATE MAJORITY PAC, http://www.senatemajority.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
154 Steven Nelson, Judge: Constitution Can’t Cloak Senator from Bribery Charges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Sept. 29, 2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/29/judge-sen-menendez-cantuse-constitution-to-avoid-bribery-charges.
155 Apuzzo, supra note 151.
156 Nicholas Confessore & Matt Apuzzo, Robert Menendez Indictment Points to Corrupting Potential of
Super PACs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/us/politics/robert-menendezindictment-points-to-corrupting-potential-of-super-pacs.html.
157 Apuzzo, supra note 151.
158 Id.
159 David Voreacos, Senator Menendez Campaign Bribery Trial Postponed to 2016, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
17, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-17/senator-menendez-bribery-trialdate-postponed-to-at-least-2016.
160 Apuzzo, supra note 151.
161 SENATE MAJORITY PAC, supra note 153.
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advocating on particular issues once in office.162 Senator Menendez likely put
Dr. Melgen’s campaign contributions toward advocating for these issues, as
opposed to using them only for his own reelection. Moreover, after the senator’s
reelection, Dr. Melgen allegedly provided him with additional, nonmonetary
bribes as incentives to support issues important to the doctor.163 The issue
advocacy could be “bought” using nonmonetary gifts, indicating that Senator
Menendez valued the advocacy.164 The potential to accept bribes, including
bribes given in exchange for issue advocacy, supports the value of issue
advocacy both during elections and while in office.
3. Governor Walker’s Alleged Conduct in Peterson
Circling back to Peterson, the alleged conduct of Governor Walker is a
particularly good example of issue advocacy’s importance to candidates. State
laws vary in the extent of their campaign finance regulation,165 and the structure
and interpretation of Wisconsin’s campaign finance statute had bound
candidates “by minimal contribution limits and tight spending limits.”166 This
“compel[led] candidates to depend increasingly upon expenditures by
[nonprofit] committees that engage in issue advocacy” rather than to rely on their
independent campaign fundraising and spending.167 The nonprofits are required
by tax laws to “focus primarily on social-welfare issues;” notwithstanding this
mandate, the advertisements containing issue advocacy have been called “thinly
veiled political ads.”168

162

Apuzzo, supra note 151.
The senator allegedly received personal favors such as “luxury vacations, golf outings, . . . and expensive
flights,” along with campaign contributions. Apuzzo, supra note 151; Burns, supra note 150.
164 See Burns, supra note 150.
165 Ferguson, supra note 30, at 485–87.
166 State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165, 239 n.15 (Wis. 2015) (Prosser, J.,
concurring). The Wisconsin statute limited funding donated directly to a candidate’s fund to $43,000 and
required full disclosure of the donor and donation amount. Pilkington et al., supra note 89. Corporations could
also not make direct political donations to candidates, but had to donate to independent third-party groups or
spend their own money on direct advertising, with disclosure requirements. Id.
167 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 239 (Prosser, J., concurring).
168 Justin Miller, Scott Walker Leaks Could Force Supreme Court to Confront Dark Money, THE AM.
PROSPECT (Sept. 16, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/scott-walker-leaks-could-force-supreme-court-confrontdark-money. Robert Maguire, a political nonprofit researcher for the Center for Responsive Politics, went a step
further, stating that the nonprofits are “pretty clearly political entities meant to do things that are not social
welfare. Saving Governor Walker’s governorship is not a social welfare function.” Id.
163
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The value of issue advocacy to Governor Walker is bolstered by statements
and conduct by his own campaign during the recall election campaigns.169 An email sent by Governor Walker’s fundraiser stated that the campaign aimed to
raise $9 million in “issue advocacy efforts” to support conservative candidates
in the senatorial recall races, which accompanied Governor Walker’s recall.170
The campaign coordinated its efforts through WCFG “to ensure correct
messaging,” because that group could “accept Corporate and Personal donations
without limitations and no donors disclosure.”171 Governor Walker participated
in at least 114 meetings or calls with potential donors during the recall
elections,172 touting the advantages of limitless, unidentified donations as talking
points.173 Their efforts ended up raising $12 million.174 Governor Walker’s
former campaign consultant indicated this money resulted in advertising and
mailings which “moved independent swing voters to the GOP candidate,”
helping the GOP maintain its majority status in the state senate.175 Recently,
Governor Walker stated that, when planning to fundraise, the campaign “thought
it was appropriate to get the message out about the facts, not talking about
advocating for or against, expressly advocating for or against candidates, but
getting the message out that the [Budget Repair Bill] reforms would work” to
help the GOP candidates survive their recall elections.176
Another unique factor affecting Peterson is that it involved a recall
election.177 In a recall election, the candidate is trying to retain an office position

169 These statements came from documents collected during the John Doe investigation. Although these
documents were ordered to be suppressed or destroyed in Peterson, the Guardian received and leaked many of
the documents in September 2016. Pilkington et al., supra note 89. The Wisconsin Supreme Court later ordered
many of redacted documents related to the case to be released. Wisconsin Supreme Court Orders John Doe
Documents in Gov. Walker Case Released, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 20, 2017, 11:07 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-wisconsin-john-doe-documents-walker-20170120-story.html.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Matthew DeFour, Leaked Records Provide Glimpse Inside Scott Walker’s Political Operation,
MADISON.COM (Sept. 19, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/leaked-recordsprovide-glimpse-inside-scott-walker-s-political-operation/article_324fa354-acee-5342-a82fef4f683f3dbc.html.
173 Pilkington et al., supra note 89.
174 This included donations to WCFG personally solicited by Governor Walker from conservative donors
nationwide, including $1 million from hedge-fund manager Stephen Cohen, $1 million from John Menard,
founder of Wisconsin-based home improvement chain Menard’s, and $15,000 following a meeting with Donald
Trump. Id.
175 Id.
176 DeFour, supra note 172.
177 Montopoli, supra note 88.
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rather than be elected to one.178 The voters already know the candidate, which
would make advocating for the candidate’s issues especially important. In
Wisconsin, the election essentially hinged on the issue of collective bargaining
rights for public sector unions,179 making communications advocating for that
issue directly impact Governor Walker’s success in the election.
The combination of the stringent Wisconsin campaign finance laws with a
recall election made issue advocacy imperative to Governor Walker. He needed
to generate support for his cause to win the election, and Wisconsin’s regulations
made individual spending difficult.180 However, issue advocacy nonprofits, such
as WCFG, could create communications supporting the Bill and avoid
Wisconsin’s strict restrictions on express advocacy and campaign spending.181
Furthermore, the alleged coordinated issue advocacy led to a long, intense
investigation of WCFG, other nonprofits, and Governor Walker,182 another
indication that the communications had value to the Walker campaign and
influenced the recall election. Overall, the intense scrutiny surrounding this case,
the importance of issues in elections, especially recall elections, and that issue
advocacy could help political candidates evade stringent campaign finance laws
demonstrate the importance of issue advocacy to political candidates.183
B. Common Sense: Appropriate Campaign Finance Regulation Decreases the
Public Perception of Corruption
Political campaigning is a routine part of American lives.184 Most people
have seen television advertisements, newspaper articles, and even bumper
stickers supporting political parties and politicians.185 Even if laypeople are not
familiar with campaign finance law, they are familiar with the communications
leading to the laws. These facts appeal to common sense, which is the

178 Recall Election, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com/topic/recall-election (last visited
Apr. 9, 2017).
179 See O’Keefe v. Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014).
180 See State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165, 179 (Wis. 2015).
181 See Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 864. Richard Briffault has noted that a principal benefit of nonprofits is
that they can “be a very good device for hiding the participation of wealthy individuals” in campaign financing
because there are no disclosure requirements for the identify of donors. Pilkington et al., supra note 89.
182 Schmitz, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 866.
183 See Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 239 (Prosser, J., concurring).
184 See Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Campaign Money, Congress, and Perceptions of Corruption, 44
AM. POL. RES. 272, 276–77 (2016) (describing the importance of the media in campaigning).
185 See id. at 276.
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appropriate place to begin analyzing the regulability of coordinated issue
advocacy.
Consider the Peterson scenario in a modified, federal context. There are two
advertisements for a democratic senatorial candidate. The candidate controlled
the advertisements’ content and timing, which an activist group in favor of
stricter gun control laws created. The first advertisement states: “A vote for
Candidate is a vote for stricter gun control laws.” The second advertisement
states: “This State must support stricter gun control laws.” Each advertisement
functionally gives the same message: vote for the candidate favoring stricter gun
control laws.
Despite the congruent messages, because one advertisement explicitly
mentions the candidate while the other only mentions the issue, the law may
have different regulatory authority over the advertisements. This raises two
questions. First, does the advertisement’s language determine the public
perception of quid pro quo corruption? Second, does whether a candidate is
involved make a difference in the potential for quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance? The law leaves the door open to answer yes; common sense
suggests no. This Comment follows the common-sense approach: candidate
involvement in political communications is what leads to the potential for or
perception of corruption.
In a representative political system, the “integrity of appearances” is
particularly important to maintain citizens’ trust in their politicians.186
Americans already perceive significant political corruption.187 Only 1% of
Americans rated the ethics and responsibility of the average member of
Congress as “excellent;” 68% rated the average congressperson’s ethics and
responsibility as either “not so good” or “poor.”188 Even more telling, when
asked how often politicians vote to please contributors, 29% responded “all the
time,” and 41% responded “often.”189 Only 1% responded “never.”190
Americans considered campaign contributors as the greatest influence on a
congressperson’s vote, even above lobbyists and well above individual voters.191
186

Id. at 274.
Id. at 273 (citing other studies which have found that “large proportions of Americans think their
Congress is corrupt”).
188 Abby Blass, Brian Roberts & Daron Shaw, Corruption, Political Participation, and Appetite for Reform:
Americans’ Assessment of the Role of Money in Politics, 11 ELECTION L.J. 380, 385 (2012).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 386.
187
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Campaign finance regulation has the power to significantly reduce this
public perception of corruption in three ways. Each way appeals to the citizens’
common sense based on their experience with campaigning, reflecting Justice
Crooks’s Peterson dissent.192 First, an actual awareness of the law can make
political funding appear less corrupt.193 To that point, at least one study has
shown that knowledge of campaign finance regulation significantly decreased
citizens’ perceptions of political corruption.194 Second, the extent of regulation
determines the amount of money that can reach a politician.195 The less money
that reaches a politician, the lower the influence the donor may appear to have
on the candidate.196 Third, campaign finance regulations restrict permissible
contact between candidates and outside organizations,197 decreasing the public’s
perception of corruption.198 Surveys by Bowler and Donovan showed that the
public perceives significantly less corruption when organizations run
independent advertisements than when organizations contribute to particular
political committees.199
Although this Comment does not go so far as to suggest reforming the entire
campaign finance regulatory system, at the least, it urges construing existing
finance laws to avoid increasing the perception of corruption. Disallowing
regulation of coordinated issue advocacy fails in that respect.
To be sure, regulating coordinated issue advocacy burdens free speech, as
does any campaign finance regulation.200 But regulating express advocacy, and
not issue advocacy, when a candidate is equally involved in creating the
communication is not a principled distinction. Although Judge Randa contended
that “logic instructs” that citizens will not perceive corruption in issue advocacy,
even if coordinated, that “logic” is not compatible with United States political
realities and its citizens’ common sense.201 The remainder of this Part analyzes

192

See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
Necmi K. Avkiran, Direnç K. Kanol & Barry Oliver, Knowledge of Campaign Finance Regulation
Reduces Perceptions of Corruption, 56 ACCT. & FIN. 961, 962 (2016).
194 Id. at 963.
195 See Blass, Roberts & Shaw, supra note 188, at 384.
196 Bowler & Donovan, supra note 184, at 279, 284–85.
197 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
198 Bowler & Donovan, supra note 184, at 283–84.
199 Id.
200 Smith, supra note 8, at 609.
201 Supra note 106 and accompanying text.
193
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the political and legal realities to affirm this common-sense approach to
determining that coordinated issue advocacy should be regulable.202
C. Legal Support for Regulation: Case Law Precedent and Bribery and AntiGratuity Laws
This section provides the legal backbone to support the common-sense
notion that coordinated issue advocacy should be regulable. Even with the
empirical evidence of issue advocacy’s value to candidates, candidate
coordination ultimately creates the government interest in preventing corruption
or its appearance.203 The existing legal framework to regulate bribery and certain
gratuities is based on a concern with quid pro quo corruption, indicating that
some regulation of coordinated issue advocacy should likewise be
permissible.204 Further, campaign finance case law itself has suggested that
coordinated communications should be regulable, regardless of their language,
because they lead to corruption or its appearance.205
1. The Law and Policy Behind Regulating Bribery and Certain Gratuities
The law against political bribery and certain gratuities is well entrenched in
federal and state statutory provisions.206 Bribery and illegal gratuities are
similar, but distinct, prohibited actions by political officials.207 The same federal
statute defines the two actions,208 as explained by the Court in United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers.209 Both bribery and illegal gratuities involve anything
of value being “corruptly given, offered, or promised to a public official (as to
the giver) or corruptly demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be
received or accepted by a public official (as to the recipient).”210 The difference
between bribery and gratuities comes in the intended purpose for the gift or

202 See Brief Amici Curiae for the Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21 Supporting Appellants and
Urging Reversal at 25–26, O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1822).
203 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1976) (per curiam).
204 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000).
205 Id.
206 See Joseph F. Savage Jr. & Brian Kelly, Courts Divide on Corruption Statute as 1st Circuit Limits 18
U.S.C. § 666 to Bribes, 28 WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, Jan. 2014, at 1 (noting that Congress enacted
18 U.S.C. § 201, criminalizing bribery and certain gratuities, in 1962, and it has been used to enforce those
crimes ever since).
207 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999).
208 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). Within the statute, § 201(b) regulates bribery, and § 201(c) regulates gratuities.
209 Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404.
210 Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
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receipt.211 Bribery requires a quid pro quo, being a specific exchange for an
official act, because it requires intent to influence an official act.212 On the other
hand, gratuities require that something of value be given or accepted for or
because of any past or future official act, rather than requiring specific intent to
influence politicians.213 Bribery and illegal gratuities carry severe penalties,
including jail time and fines, indicating the importance of discouraging these
acts.214
The government’s interest in preventing corruption and its appearance lies
behind prohibiting bribery and certain gratuities, just as that policy lies behind
regulating political contributions.215 The Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC216 acknowledged that the analogy is not perfect, because
“neither law nor morals equate all political contributions, without more, with
bribes.”217 Nonetheless, it reinforced that the same interest underlies these areas
of law,218 making bribery and illegal gratuity regulations an appropriate analogy
to the regulation of coordination.
The bribery and illegal gratuity statute focuses on the resulting quid pro quo
or influence on a candidate.219 It does not focus on the content of the bribe or
gratuity.220 Because the same government interest underlies those statutes and
contribution limits,221 the coordinated communication’s content likewise should
not affect its regulability. Analogizing to bribery, if coordination results in a quid
pro quo, the government has a strong interest in preventing that conduct and
should be able to regulate it.222 Analogizing to gratuities, when a candidate
coordinates a communication, that conduct is enough to lead to, at the least, the
appearance of corruption.223 To protect the government’s interest in preventing

211

Id. at 404–05.
Id.
213 Id. at 405.
214 Id.
215 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976)
(per curiam).
216 528 U.S. 377.
217 Id. at 390.
218 Id.
219 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
220 See id.
221 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
222 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–28.
223 Id.
212
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actual or perceived corruption,224 it needs to be able to regulate coordinated
communications containing issue advocacy.
2. Case Law Precedent
No federal case has provided specific guidance on whether the regulability
of coordinated communications depends on a communication’s content.225
Nonetheless, the policy developed through case law to allow regulating
contributions supports the proposition that all coordinated communications are
regulable.226
First, the Buckley Court’s policy for regulating coordinated communications
indicates the Court’s intention to disregard a communication’s content in
determining its regulability.227 The Court focused on the risk for “real or
apparent corruption” and “attempts to circumvent [FECA] through prearranged
or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions.”228
Experience and common sense suggest that the risk of corruption or
circumventing FECA arises when a candidate is involved in any aspect of a
communication’s content or dissemination. This is true in spite of the Court
stating this policy interest in light of coordinated express advocacy.229
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission later addressed the Buckley
policy concerns, where multiple opinions indicated that coordination should be
used to determine the regulability of communications.230 The plurality opinion
succinctly noted that the distinction between express and issue advocacy “has
not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption.”231 In
effect, that gives the distinction no place in determining the regulability of
communications.232 Justice Kennedy was even more explicit in implicating the
corruption potential of contributions themselves.233 He interpreted Buckley to
mean that all contributions have a “quid pro quo nature . . . pos[ing] inherent
224

Id. at 29.
O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F. 3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2014).
226 Brief Amici Curiae for the Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21 Supporting Appellants and Urging
Reversal, O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1822).
227 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–28.
228 Id. at 46–47.
229 See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
230 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
231 Id. at 193–94.
232 Id.; see Brief Amici Curiae for the Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21 Supporting Appellants and
Urging Reversal at 21–23, O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1822).
233 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 298 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
225
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corruption potential.”234 Even though Justice Kennedy specifically referenced
the corruption potential of large financial contributions,235 his logic easily
extends to the corruption potential of other forms of contributions, like
coordinated communications.
A third case, Citizens United, condemns the distinction between express and
issue advocacy in assessing a communication’s regulability.236 In determining
disclosure requirements for electioneering communications under BCRA, the
Court refused to draw a line between express advocacy, along with its functional
equivalent, and issue advocacy.237 This refusal was consistent with Buckley and
McConnell’s precedent, which had allowed for disclosure requirements in spite
of an impediment on First Amendment rights.238
A couple of factors stemming from Citizens United suggest that the
distinction between express and issue advocacy should be likewise rejected for
coordination. First, disclosure requirements are based on an interest in
preventing corruption, the same interest as in regulating contributions, like
coordination.239 In addition, one content standard for determining regulable
coordinated communications is electioneering communications.240 Following
Citizens United, a court could not examine the language of an electioneering
communication to determine disclosure requirements, but under BCRA, the
other content standards would involve examining the communication’s
language. There is no sense in the differing treatment of the content standards.
Finally, Peterson references two lower court cases worth noting. First, as the
dissent points out in Peterson, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Barland II is not
dispositive on the regulability of coordinated issue advocacy, contrary to the
majority’s contention in Peterson.241 The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied
heavily on Barland II in contending that issue advocacy “must remain

234 Id. (second emphasis added). This statement reinforces the common-sense notion that coordination’s
policy concerns are not just related to coordinated express advocacy.
235 Id.
236 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010).
237 Id.
238 See id.; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193 (refusing to apply the distinction to electioneering communication
regulation); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (per curiam) (allowing regulation of contributions).
239 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 36, 38.
240 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(1) (2017).
241 State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165, 273 (Wis. 2015) (Abrahamson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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unencumbered.”242 However, in Barland II, the court did not examine
coordinated speech, but examined the regulability of independent
expenditures.243 The distinction is important because after Buckley, regulations
on independent expenditures are generally not permitted.244 When independent
expenditures were regulated, the court closely considered First Amendment
principles to limit the scope of regulable speech.245 However, with coordinated
speech, the government has a stronger, legitimate interest in preventing
corruption and its appearance.246 Therefore, the rationale in Barland II of
limiting the scope of regulable independent expenditures should not be applied
to coordinated speech.247 The Peterson court’s reliance on that case as precedent
was inappropriate.
Second, Justice Abrahamson’s dissent relied on FEC v. Christian
Coalition,248 a D.C. Circuit case, for its interpretation of Buckley.249 The
Christian Coalition court stated that “[i]mporting the ‘express advocacy’
standard into [the contribution regulation at issue] would misread Buckley and
collapse the distinction between contributions and independent expenditures.”250
This would allow the real and perceived corruption that the government has a
compelling interest to prevent.251 The clear connection between contributions,
like coordination, and the potential for corruption indicates that coordinated
issue advocacy can be, and should be, regulated.252

242 Id. at 188 (quoting Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland (Barland II), 751 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir.
2014)) (emphasis omitted).
243 Barland II, 751 F.3d at 807 (“[T]he complaint alleges that the challenged laws . . . unjustifiably burden
the free-speech rights of independent political speakers.” (emphasis added)).
244 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.
245 Barland II, 751 F.3d at 842.
246 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
247 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 273 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
248 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999). Although this case was decided prior to the passage of BCRA and the
new regulations defining coordination, very few federal cases have closely examined the definition of
coordination, making this case a valuable analytical tool. See Smith, supra note 8, at 624 (noting that “only one
federal district court decision,” Christian Coalition, “has examined coordination in depth”).
249 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 270–72.
250 Id. at 270–71 (quoting Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 88) (modification in original). Christian
Coalition analyzed multiple factors to determine coordination’s regulability, which did not include the type of
speech. See Smith, supra note 8, at 624–25.
251 Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 270–71.
252 Id. at 271–72.
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IV. PRACTICAL CONCERNS
This final Part explores the importance of regulating coordinated issue
advocacy in the Super PAC era and potential fallout if coordinated issue
advocacy were regulated. The purpose of regulation is to prevent corruption or
its appearance;253 therefore, it is critical that the regulation serves this intended
purpose, and that it does not overstep its bounds. A potential impediment to
preventing corruption arises with Super PACs, because legal candidate
involvement in unlimited corporate fundraising may limit issue advocacy’s
importance. Regulation may also be inappropriate in uncontested or
noncompetitive elections, or in regulating communication between lobbyists and
candidates. This Part alleviates these concerns by demonstrating that regulating
coordinated issue advocacy would effectively prevent corruption and the
appearance of corruption in appropriate situations.
A. Coordinated Issue Advocacy Has Continued Value in the Super PAC Era
Likely the most significant development in campaign financing post-Citizens
United is the rise of the Super PAC.254 Citizens United limited the government’s
interest to only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.255 By doing so, it
eliminated the government’s corruption interest in independent expenditures by
corporations because when corporations make independent expenditures, it does
“not give rise to . . . the appearance of corruption.”256 The result was the rise of
a new form of campaign financing: the Super PAC.257
In the most basic sense, Super PACs are entities that cannot coordinate
directly with candidates, and as such can spend and accept unlimited funds.258
Their ability to raise funds in excess of campaign finance limits makes Super
PACs valuable to political campaigns.259 Although Super PACs cannot
contribute directly to candidates, they have become more candidate-specific.260

253

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010).
Note, Working Together for an Independent Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with Super PAC
Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1481–82 (2015) [hereinafter Working Together].
255 See supra note 37.
256 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357; Working Together, supra note 254, at 1481–82.
257 Working Together, supra note 254, at 1482.
258 Id. Corporations and labor unions are two of the largest contributors to Super PACs, but individuals can
independently pool resources to contribute as well. Id. at 1485.
259 Id. at 1485.
260 Id. at 1483–84. As of November 2015, 90% of funding from outside groups like Super PACs to
campaigns has come from single candidate financing. Paul Blumenthal, How Super PACs and Campaigns Are
254
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Candidates have found methods to legally support their affiliated Super PACs,
including soliciting contributions for a Super PAC up to federal limits or
providing a Super PAC with donor lists.261 Although the extensive collaboration
between candidates and Super PACs has led to allegations of excessive, illegal
coordination,262 candidates have continued to rely heavily on Super PAC
financing into the 2016 presidential campaign.263
Super PACs have a significant role in financing campaigns, and candidates
have legal avenues to support specific Super PACs.264 Where does that leave the
real-world value of coordinated issue advocacy? Why should the government
concern itself with regulating coordinated issue advocacy if Super PACs provide
an avenue around campaign finance regulations anyways? The answer to these
questions comes from the movement to restrict Super PAC funding for elections
and communication with candidates.265
Due to concerns with the extent of legal candidate involvement with Super
PACs, there have been calls to reform campaign finance law.266 Proponents of
change seek to increase the scope of regulable candidate coordination.267 Many
states regulate coordination more extensively than the federal government, thus
restricting the legal communication between a Super PAC and a candidate.268
Federally, House Bill 5641269 purports to expand the definition of coordinated
expenditures to include payments “not made entirely independently of the
candidate.”270 This would include payments “made pursuant to any general or
particular understanding, or more than incidental communication.”271 Thus,
even tacit approval by a candidate would be enough to trigger regulable
coordination.272 The bill would likely apply to spending by candidate-specific
Super PACs due to their explicit connection with a candidate.273 In addition, the
Coordinating in 2016, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2015, 9:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
super-pac-coordination_56463f85e4b045bf3def0273.
261 Blumenthal, supra note 260.
262 Working Together, supra note 254, at 1486–87.
263 For a discussion on the role of Super PACs in the pre-election period for the 2016 presidential election,
see Blumenthal, supra note 260.
264 Working Together, supra note 254, at 1485–86.
265 Ferguson, supra note 30, at 488.
266 Id. at 492.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 485–86.
269 H.R. 5641, 113th Cong. (2014).
270 H.R. 5641 § 324(b)(1).
271 Id.
272 See id.; H.R. 5641 § 324(c)(2)(A).
273 See Working Together, supra note 254, at 1485–86.
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American Anti-Corruption Act is a proposed model legislation for state and
federal law that would impose campaign finance regulations on Super PACs,
restricting coordination with candidates.274
Scholarly commentators have also supported limiting candidate involvement
in Super PAC funding.275 Campaign finance law scholars both traditionally for
and against expanding campaign finance regulation have expressed some
measure of support for increasing regulation of coordinated fundraising with
specific Super PACs.276 The Harvard Law Review proposed a new framework
for regulating coordination in the Super PAC era.277 It consists of a four part
regulatory scheme, where candidates may not: (1) attend Super PAC fundraising
events, (2) solicit any contributions on behalf of Super PACs, (3) share outside
fundraising consultants with Super PACs, or (4) provide supporter lists directly
to Super PACs.278 The scheme would supposedly limit quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance, reflecting the rationale for regulating coordination in
general.279
The crux of these proposed changes to Super PAC regulation is that although
Super PACs are an influential cog in the campaign finance machine today, their
influence may not last forever. If Super PAC influence were diminished,
candidates would look to other forms of financing to avoid regulation and
generate comparable financing. Unregulable, coordinated speech such as,
potentially, issue advocacy, would become highly attractive to candidates.
Candidates engaging in unfettered coordinated issue advocacy would result in
the very corruption or appearance of corruption that regulating Super PACs is
supposed to prevent. In light of this risk, determining issue advocacy’s
regulability is an important issue to address now.

274 Ferguson, supra note 30, at 492–93; It’s Time to End Corruption, AM. ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT,
http://anticorruptionact.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); Fight Corruption in America: Stop Political Bribery,
End Secret Money, and Fix Our Broken Elections, AM. ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT, http://anticorruptionact.org/
whats-in-the-act/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
275 See, e.g., Working Together, supra note 254, at 1494.
276 Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 92 (2013); Smith,
supra note 8, at 635.
277 Working Together, supra note 254, at 1494.
278 Id. at 1495.
279 Id. at 1496–97.
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B. Regulation of Coordinated Issue Advocacy Is Appropriate in Uncontested
or Noncompetitive Elections
Uncontested and noncompetitive elections are becoming a societal norm,
caused primarily by intense partisanship divides and the power of
incumbency.280 These elections are especially prevalent in state legislative
elections.281 In 2014, 32.8% of voters in state senate elections and 40.4% of
voters in state house elections faced ballots featuring a single candidate, while
in contested elections, only 4.9% of Americans lived in districts where a state
legislative candidate won by less than 5% of the vote.282 To an extent, federal
elections also follow this trend.283 The Republican Party did not challenge thirtyseven Democratic house seats, and the Democratic Party left uncontested thirtytwo Republican house seats.284 In 2014, very few contested federal elections
were decided by less than 5% of the vote: around 6% of elections for the U.S.
House of Representatives and 13% of elections for the U.S. Senate.285
Despite running in unopposed or relatively noncompetitive elections,
candidates still have an incentive to campaign.286 The main purpose of all
campaign advertisements falls into two categories: increase votes and increase
campaign funding.287 Although the number of votes may not be as important to
these candidates, receiving campaign and party funding motivates candidates to
create political communications.288 In a presidential campaign, candidates can
increase funding by advertising in noncompetitive states.289 Similarly, outside
organizations like interest groups have a motive to fundraise for candidates
supporting their cause, potentially by creating issue advocacy. A candidate
would prefer to coordinate these communications with the organization to

280 Carl Klarner, Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections: 1972–2014, BALLOTPEDIA.ORG (May 6,
2015), https://ballotpedia.org/Competitiveness_in_State_Legislative_Elections:_1972-2014.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 How to Win 99.6% of the Vote, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 25, 2014) [hereinafter How to Win],
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21627661-too-many-members-congress-are-runningunopposed-how-win-996-vote.
285 Klarner, supra note 280.
286 Carly Urban & Sarah Niebler, Dollars on the Sidewalk: Should U.S. Presidential Candidates Advertise
in Uncontested States?, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 322, 322 (2014).
287 Id.
288 How to Win, supra note 284. Representative Mike Capuano, running unopposed for a Congressional
seat that he has held since 1998, raised $628,000 for his campaign. He used the money to fund other Democratic
campaigns and held onto enough money “to dissuade potential opponents.” Id.
289 Urban & Niebler, supra note 286, at 334.
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ensure that the communications reflect positively on the candidate’s policies and
potentially increase the candidate’s campaign donations.290
On its face, regulating coordinated issue advocacy in uncontested or
noncompetitive elections may appear unnecessary. A candidate gains no
significant advantage in votes over a nonexistent or nonthreatening opponent by
coordinating public communications.291 Also, candidate security in her
representative status may indicate public satisfaction with the candidate’s work.
Therefore, the public may be less concerned with corruption of its politician,
decreasing the government’s interest in the appearance of corruption.
That being said, even when a candidate is guaranteed to win, the
government’s interest in preventing corruption or its appearance overcomes First
Amendment rights to permit regulating coordinated issue advocacy. Regardless
of an election’s competitiveness, issue advocacy has value to candidates,292 and
coordination creates a connection to the organization. In a sense, coordination
in these elections may raise an even greater specter of corruption. Knowing a
candidate is guaranteed to hold office creates an incentive for organizations to
assist the candidate through advertising because the candidate will have power
to implement favorable policies for the organization. Therefore, the same
corruption risk that arises in any other election with coordinated
communications arises in uncontested or noncompetitive elections.
Even if the government’s interest in preventing corruption were not as strong
in uncontested or noncompetitive elections, permitting regulation of coordinated
issue advocacy would not significantly burden the First Amendment rights of
candidates or outside organizations.293 Regarding candidates in these elections,
many, if not all, would not take advantage of potential issue advocacy in
advertising.294 Ever since the George W. Bush presidential campaign in 2000,
presidential candidates have not been advertising in noncompetitive states,
290 See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 464 (2001); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam) (acknowledging the risks inherent in independent spending by outside
organizations by stating that “[u]nlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive,” because an “absence of
prearrangement and coordination . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate” (emphasis
added)).
291 See How to Win, supra note 284 (noting that a candidate secure in his position in Congress did not spend
the majority of the campaign’s funding on advertising).
292 See supra Part III.B.
293 Cf. Urban & Niebler, supra note 286, at 334 (noting that presidential candidates have not spent in
noncompetitive states in recent years).
294 Id.
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despite the power of advertising in fundraising.295 Regarding outside
organizations, regulating coordinated issue advocacy would not significantly
alter advertising decisions. Even if a candidate would not or could not coordinate
in creating an advertisement, outside organizations have independent interests,
beyond specific candidates, motivating them to advertise.296 For example,
although political candidates have not spent money to advertise in
noncompetitive states,297 interest groups have continued to advertise
independently of the candidates.298 Therefore, even if the government’s interest
in preventing corruption is not as strong, regulating coordinated issue advocacy
in uncontested or noncompetitive elections is unlikely to have a significant effect
on exercising First Amendment rights, further supporting regulation in these
elections.
C. Lobbying Efforts Would Survive Regulation of Coordinated Issue Advocacy
Lobbying has become an influential aspect of the American political
system.299 Lobbyists serve three essential functions: (1) fundraising through
campaign donations, (2) mobilizing voters, and (3) increasing the quality of
information available to politicians when making official decisions.300
Individuals and groups with expertise in a field requiring legislation can provide
information to politicians, who cannot be experts in all fields.301
However, due to the close communication between politicians and lobbyists,
there is a concern with politicians being corrupted by lobbyists.302 The
corruption concern arises when lobbyists contribute to candidates without
disclosing the contributions.303 The Honest Leadership and Open Government
Act of 2007304 (HLOGA) banned “gifts,” such as gratuities and favors, from
295

Id.
Cf. id. at 334 n.45 (noting that interest groups spend money to advertise in non-competitive states).
297 See id. at 334.
298 Id. at 334 n.45.
299 Angela Lynne Davis, Genuine Reform or Just Another Meager Attempt to Regulate Lobbyists: A
Critique of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 340, 343
(2009).
300 G. RICHARD SHELL, MAKE THE RULES OR YOUR RIVALS WILL 37–42 (2004); see also Gajan Retnasaba,
Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Corrupt? Evidence from Public Finance, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 145,
164 (2006). Many politicians consider the most important function of these three to be increasing information.
SHELL, supra, at 40–41 (quoting former Senator Ned Pattison as saying that the most helpful lobbyists “brought
technical information . . . that would enable [him] to understand the issues” behind a bill).
301 SHELL, supra note 300, at 40–41; Retnasaba, supra note 300, at 164.
302 See Davis, supra note 299, at 350; Retnasaba, supra note 300, at 164.
303 See Davis, supra note 299, at 350.
304 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735.
296
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lobbyists to politicians,305 but lobbyists can still contribute and donate to interest
groups supporting politicians.306
Lobbying regulation is based on a concern with perceived or actual
corruption,307 as is coordination of issue advocacy.308 Thus, regulating
coordinated issue advocacy may also affect lobbying efforts. For example,
assume an organization engaged in lobbying is working with a senator to
encourage a bill’s passage. The lobbyist wants to run an advertisement
supporting the issue behind the bill, but the lobbyist has discussed the issue with
the politician. Would this communication be subject to the campaign finance
regulation of coordinated issue advocacy?
Even though this scenario presents the same potential for corruption that
HLOGA, other lobbying reform acts,309 and FECA have attempted to curtail,
imposing regulation of issue advocacy would not necessarily imperil lobbying
activities. The important distinction between coordinated issue advocacy under
FECA and in lobbying is that lobbying occurs when a politician is already in
office, not during the campaign process.310 FECA regulations would only apply
during an election campaign.311 Therefore, even if a lobbyist cannot coordinate
with a candidate to run advertisements containing issue advocacy while the
candidate is running for office, once elected, the lobbyist should be able to
coordinate issue advocacy up to the limits mandated by lobbying regulations.
Regulating coordinated issue advocacy would impact certain lobbyist
communications while an incumbent campaigns for reelection, because at that
point, the communications would be regulated by FECA.312 However, regulation
would not mean that the lobbyist could not create a coordinated communication;
the communication would simply be subject to FECA’s disclosure requirements
and spending limits. Due to the potential for quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance present in both lobbying and coordination,313 there is a very strong
government interest in regulating lobbyist interactions with politicians during

305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313

Davis, supra note 299, at 359.
Id. at 361.
See id. at 350; Retnasaba, supra note 300, at 164.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–28 (1976) (per curiam).
For a discussion of various lobbying reform acts, see Davis, supra note 299, at 344–48.
See supra text accompanying note 34.
See supra text accompanying note 34.
See supra text accompanying note 34.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–28; Retnasaba, supra note 300, at 164.
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elections.314 This government interest should justify any impediment on the First
Amendment rights of a lobbyist and candidate during an election.315 Therefore,
regulating coordinated issue advocacy would not normally affect politician–
lobbyist interactions, and when it does, the government interest in preventing
corruption and its appearance justifies regulation.
CONCLUSION
Campaign finance regulation continues to be a contentious area of law.
Balancing the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and
association with the government’s interest in preventing actual or perceived
corruption is a struggle unlikely to end anytime soon. Coordination between
candidates and outside organizations raises an important consideration, because
preventing communication with candidates inhibits First Amendment rights.
However, the blatant appearance of corruption, if not actual corruptive
influence, should be sufficient to justify regulating coordinated issue advocacy.
Although it is arguable that the bifurcation between express and issue
advocacy should determine a communication’s regulability, this contention is
without merit. Whether a communication expressly mentions a candidate or
simply mentions the issues that the candidate supports, it nonetheless becomes
associated with the candidate. Common sense suggests that if a candidate is
involved at all, the candidate values the communication. In the eyes of a
skeptical public, that is enough to raise, at the least, the appearance of corruption.
An artificial divide in regulability based on a communication’s language is
inconsistent with other areas of law. Bribery and anti-gratuity laws are based on
the same policy interest in preventing corruption as regulation of contributions.
Yet the former do not have standards to invoke regulation that specify the
content of a bribe or purpose of a contribution—giving or receiving anything of
value is enough. Following these laws is the appropriate path.
Underlying the understanding of campaign finance law is an intense
partisanship split.316 Peterson was a 4–2 decision split along party lines.317
314 See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing lobbying regulation regarding gifts or favors to
politicians).
315 See supra Part IV.B.
316 Smith, supra note 8, at 619 (“[Buckley] has been criticized from the political right and from the political
left.”).
317 See Monica Davey, Scott Walker 2012 Campaign Inquiry Ended by Wisconsin Court, N.Y. TIMES (July
16,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/wisconsin-court-to-rule-on-inquiry-involving-scott-
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Justice Gableman’s majority opinion focused on First Amendment rights to deny
regulation, a traditionally conservative focus.318 Meanwhile, Justice
Abrahamson’s dissent reflects a more liberal attitude, going so far as to claim
that the conservative majority had determined “to reach its desired result by
whatever means necessary.”319 Justice Abrahamson was concerned with a loss
of integrity in campaign finance regulations from this decision.320 If “[u]ntold
millions of dollars in undisclosed contributions could be funneled into a 501(c)
nonprofit entity that purchases issue ads written or approved by a candidate or
the candidate’s campaign manager,” contribution limits would be “porous” and
disclosure requirements would be “useless.”321
The ultimate effect of Wisconsin Supreme Court’s holding in Peterson, and
whether any other jurisdictions will follow its lead, remains to be seen. The
political scene in the state remains contentious, with those lauding the decision’s
emphasis on protecting free speech322 contrasted with those fundamentally
concerned about this decision ending all campaign finance regulation.323 In
response to the case, Governor Walker signed legislation prohibiting use of a
John Doe investigation to look into misconduct in office and bribery of public
officials, among other matters.324 These and other actions by the state
walkers-2012-campaign.html. Interestingly, Peterson became especially politically charged because the
investigation focused on conservative groups. See John Doe, supra note 94. As a result of this conduct, the John
Doe investigation became framed as an attack on the free speech rights of conservatives. Id. (describing how
Wisconsin’s “Republicans have denounced the second John Doe investigation into Walker and his allies as a
political witch hunt”). WCFG president Eric O’Keefe characterized the John Doe investigation as “a politically
motivated attack and a criminal investigation in search of a theory.” The Latest: Walker Applauds Those Who
Fought Investigation, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/3/thelatest-walker-silent-on-supreme-court-victory/. Therefore, along with the expected partisanship influence, the
desire to protect Republican ideals from perceived attack by Democrats may have affected the Peterson decision.
318 See State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165, 178 (Wis. 2015).
319 Id. at 254 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
320 Id. at 261 (quoting O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014)).
321 Id.
322 See, e.g., Deborah Jordahl, Free Speech Is on the Line in Wisconsin, WISCONSINJOHNDOE.COM (Oct.
21, 2015), http://wisconsinjohndoe.com/2015/10/21/free-speech-is-on-the-line-in-wisconsin/; John Stossel,
Wisconsin’s Shame: How Free Is Free Speech in America?, FOX NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.foxnews.
com/opinion/2015/10/21/wisconsins-shame-how-free-is-free-speech.html.
323 See, e.g., Matthew DeFour, Federal Judge’s Ruling on Evidence Could Fuel John Doe Appeal to U.S.
Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2015), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/federaljudge-s-ruling-on-evidence-could-fuel-john-doe/article_7c60ccf2-18fa-5fdc-ac62-b1bad9075075.html
(describing critics’ responses to the Peterson decision); Brendan Fischer, Five Things to Know About the Scott
Walker John Doe Ruling, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY (July 16, 2015, 5:57 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/
news/2015/07/12887/five-things-know-about-scott-walker-john-doe-ruling (stating that the supreme court’s
ruling “guts Wisconsin campaign finance law”).
324 Patrick Marley, Scott Walker Signs Bill Limiting Doe Probes as Records Are Released, MILWAUKEE
WIS. J. SENTINEL (Oct. 23, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/scott-walker-signs-bill-
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legislature325 and government had led to strong calls for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari on the case,326 which was denied on October 3, 2016.327
The partisanship split, along with a lack of Supreme Court guidance, make
the future of this area of law unclear. The difference in perspectives may mean
that other states with conservative leaning governments may be open to
construing their state statutes similarly to Wisconsin.328 This Comment
expresses hope that state legislators and judges look to both the letter and policy
of the law, and not just ideologies, before making such influential decisions.
Candidates for political office must be accountable to the voters, and they cannot
use issue advocacy to avoid this critical obligation.
AMANDA R. SCHWARZENBART

limiting-john-doe-b99602429z1-336367161.html. Interestingly, in the Wisconsin Senate and Assembly, all
Republicans voted to support the bill and all Democrats opposed it. John Doe, supra note 94.
325 The Wisconsin Legislature had also proposed a bill that would have, in essence, codified the Peterson
decision. See A.B. 605, 2015 Assemb., 102d Sess. (Wis. 2015). The bill would have amended the text of
Wisconsin’s campaign finance regulation statute to read that acts made for “a political purpose” include “[t]he
making of a communication in reference to a clearly identified candidate that expressly advocates the election,
defeat, recall, or retention of that candidate and that clearly relates to that candidate’s campaign.” Id. (amended
portions in italics). The bill failed to pass pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 1 on April 13, 2016. State of
Wisconsin Assembly Journal, 2016 Assemb., 102d (Wis. 2016). The definition of “political purposes” has since
been removed from the Wisconsin Statute. See WIS. STAT. § 11.0101 (2017).
326 DeFour, supra note 323. Furthermore, there were allegations that “two conservative justices refused to
recuse themselves despite having received outside support from the Wisconsin Club for Growth during their
own previous judicial elections,” which may have led to an unfair trial. Miller, supra note 168; see also
Pilkington et al., supra note 89. One commentator had hypothesized that, following the death of Justice Scalia,
the recusal issue may have been a more likely reason for the Court to grant certiorari than whether issue advocacy
is regulable, as the campaign finance issue may have resulted in a 4–4 split. Rick Hasen, WI John Doe Cert.
Petition Raises Substantial Questions, but #SCOTUS May Not Bite, ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2016, 8:08
AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=82420.
327 Scott Bauer, Supreme Court Rejects Bid to Reopen Walker Campaign Probe, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Oct. 3, 2016, 3:11 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-10-03/supreme-court-rejects-toreopen-gov-walker-investigation.
328 For a further discussion of partisanship in decisions of state supreme court justices today, see generally
Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: The Empirical Relationship
Between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S161 (2015).
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